

*Lecture 9: Dignāga and the New Buddhist Logical Method*

In the 7<sup>th</sup> lecture (just before the 8<sup>th</sup> reviewing lecture), we have mentioned some of the important logical treatises compiled by Dignāga. In the relevant lecture when we are dealing with the *wheel of reason* (9 possibilities of the examples and the valid examples), we shall provide some necessary readings of Dignāga's treatises and explain the key contributions of those treatises made to the Buddhist logical reasoning method.

Otherwise we will not discuss those treatises in detail for two reasons. First, although Dignāga's logical treatises are important and luckily there are preserved in Chinese or Tibetan translations, most of those treatises are dealing with not only logical matters but also epistemological issues in general. It would be difficult to understand if we mix those two related topics. Secondly, as far as Buddhist logical reasoning is concerned, Dignāga's contributions are more or less straightforward. So instead of getting lost in the endless philosophical expressions, we shall single out the most important terms/concepts and explain them along the basic structure of the 3-membered logical method that was perpetuated by Dignāga and thereafter.

*Clarifications of some terms:*

*Pakṣa*: basically, the term means subject, and here it means of a subject of a thesis, such a mountain; but the meaning of the term is very much complicated because sometimes it is translated into Latin term *probandum* – or *that which is to be proved*; so in the thesis “there is a fire in the mountain”, it has to be contextualized to understand the *subject* or *that which is to be proved/probandum*, of the thesis; here, *the mountain* is referred as *subject* because the thesis is understood as *the mountain possesses fire*, but the emphasis is not *the fire in the mountain*; in other words, *fire here is the character of the mountain*, in which place it occurs or exists. We may actually understand the thesis as: *the mountain is on fire or burning*. Of course we know it is not the mountain itself is burning but there is a fire that is burning on the mountain. So, in short, please keep the broad context when you are encountering the term *pakṣa*.

*Vyāpti-jñāna*: knowledge of *invariable concomitance* between the reason/mark/sign and the predicated character (such as fire and smoke or impermanence and the sound); this is easy to understand, for as we discussed, there must be a association that fire and smoke, or otherwise it is pointless to prove that fire because of smoke. But because the association – *invariable concomitance* – both fire and smoke exist together, if there is one, the must be the other; for instance, under the sufficient light and right angle, a object and its shadow always go hand in hand.

*Pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna*: the observation of the mark as being present in the subject/*pakṣa*; it means that the mountain possess fire because of the mark – smoke; again, here the *pakṣa* is the burning mountain (understand as mountain is on fire or it possesses fire) and *pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna* is the knowledge of the property of the mountain – fire-ness or being on fire; [so, because of the *pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna*, the smoke/mark/sign and fire-ness are connected; and then because of *pakṣa-dharmatā-jñāna*, then it connects with *pakṣa* itself and the mark; so it is like this syllogism: if A, then B, if B then C, so if A then C;  $A \rightarrow B, B \rightarrow C, \therefore A \rightarrow C$ ]

*Hetu* and *liṅga*: as you may have noticed, a word may possess two kinds of meaning, which are *denotation* and the *connotation*. The first one, *denotation*, is the main meaning of the word. For example, the word *invalid* denotes that meaning of not valid. But there is another meaning of the word *invalid*, which means a very fragile person because of a serious illness.

Here, the word *hetu* and *liṅga* are not synonymous but they indicate some similar *connotation*. *Hetu* means *reason*, and *liṅga* means *sign* or *mark*. In the logical reasoning sequent/structure such as fire and smoke, the *reason* that fire can be inferred is because of the smoke. In a similar way, because of the *mark* or *sign* - smoke, there must be some fire. But when you understand the sound and impermanence, the *reason* - producedness, may be viewed as a *sign/mark* of its characteristic - *conditioned*.

*Trairūpya*: three characteristics of the reason (see Stcherbatsky, pp.242-245; please notice that Stcherbatsky translated as *the three aspects of the reason*). We shall say more about this important term in forthcoming the lecture.

### ***Reading suggestion***

For this week, you should once again review all the relevant previous readings, in particular the discussion about *inference* and Buddhist *sylogism* in part III of *Buddhist Logic*. Please read pp.242-254, in particular pp.242-245 about the 3 aspects of reason, which we shall discuss in next lecture.

The law of thoughts, such as *law of contradiction/non-contradiction* and *law of excluded-middle* are important elements of logical reasoning. So you should read pp.400-443 of *Buddhist Logic* and acquire some information about the laws of thought.

Meanwhile, if you have some spare time, do not forget to read some pages from *Logic: An Introduction*, which will keep your interest in our course. Otherwise I think you may start to feel our course of logical reasoning a little bit dry and boring.