The third condition is easily explained. The sign must not be present where the signified is not present. For otherwise, as we have already noted, the sign will be *deviating*, and would be a "pseudo-sign." Why the second condition? Did Diṅnāga overshoot his mark? Is not the second condition redundant (for the first and the third seem to be sufficient to guarantee adequacy)? These questions were raised in the tradition by both the Naiyāyikas like Uddyotakara (circa 550–625 AD), and the Buddhists like Dharmakīrti (circa 600–660 AD). Some, such as Dharmakīrti, maintained that it was slightly repetitious but not exactly redundant. The second condition states positively what the third, for the sake of emphasis, states negatively. The second is here rephrased as: the sign should be present in all *sapakṣas*. The contraposed version can then be formulated with a little ingenuity as: the sign should be absent from all *vipakṣas*. For *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, along with the *pakṣa*, exhaust the universe of discourse.

Other interpreters try to find additional justification for the second condition to argue against the "redundancy" charge. The interpretation becomes complicated, and we will postpone going into the details until chapter 4. Logically speaking, it seems that the second condition is redundant, but epistemologically speaking, a case of the co-presence of *A* and *B* may be needed to suggest the possibility, at least, that one may be the sign for the other. Perhaps Diṅnāga's concern here was epistemological.

Diṅnāga's Wheel of Reason/Sign

When a sign is identified, there are three possibilities. The sign may be present in all, some, or none of the *sapakṣas*. Likewise, it may be present in all, some or none of the *vipakṣas*. To identify a sign, we have to assume that it is present in the *pakṣa*, however; that is, the first condition is already satisfied. Combining these, Diṅnāga constructed his "wheel of reason" with nine distinct possibilities, which may be tabulated in Figure 1.1.

Of these nine possibilities, Diṅnāga asserted that only two are illustrative of sound inference for only they meet all the three conditions. They are Numbers 2 and 8. Notice that either (– *vipakṣa* and + *sapakṣa*), or (– *vipakṣa* and ± *sapakṣa*) would fulfill the required conditions. Diṅnāga is insistent that at least one *sapakṣa* must have the positive sign. Number 5 is *not* a case of sound inference; this sign is a pseudo-sign. For although it satisfies the two conditions 1 and 3 above, it does not satisfy condition 2. So one can argue that as far as Diṅnāga was concerned all three were necessary conditions. The second row does not satisfy condition 2 and hence none of Numbers 4, 5, and 6 are logical signs; they are pseudo-signs. Numbers 4 and 6 are called "contradictory" pseudo-signs—an improvement upon the old *Nyāyasūtra* definition

FIGURE 1.1
DIṄNĀGA'S WHEEL OF REASON

1 + *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*	2 – *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*	3 ± *vipakṣa* + *sapakṣa*
4 + *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*	5 – *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*	6 ± *vipakṣa* – *sapakṣa*
7 + *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*	8 – *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*	9 ± *vipakṣa* ± *sapakṣa*

+ = all, ± = some, – = none.

of contradictory. The middle one, Number 5, is called "uniquely deviating" (*asādhāraṇa*), perhaps for the reason that this sign becomes an unique sign of the *pakṣa* itself, and is not found anywhere else. In Diṅnāga's system, this sign cannot be a sign for anything else, it can only point to itself reflexively or to its own locus. Numbers 1, 3, 7, and 9 are also pseudo-signs. They are called the "deviating" signs, for in each case the sign occurs in some *vipakṣa* or other, although each fulfills the second condition. This shows that at least in Diṅnāgá's own view, the second condition (when it is combined with the first) gives only a necessary condition for being an adequate sign, not a sufficient one. In other words, Diṅnāga intended all three conditions jointly to formulate a sufficient condition.